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In January of 1988, the Chief Judge of the highest court of New York
commissioned sixteen citizens to consider whether minorities in that state
believe the court system to be biased. The answer was immediately appar-
ent. With striking regularity minority people, in New York and elsewhere
in the United States, report conviction that the law will work to their
disadvantage. Every relevant opinion poll of which the Commission is
aware finds that minorities are more likely than other Americans to doubt
the fairness of the court system."
Having quickly discovered evidence of a widespread minority percep-
tion of bias within the courts, the Commission was left to consider its
causes. The causes are not easily established. Those who perceive the
courts as biased admit that incidents of alleged bias are usually ambigu-
ous; that systematic evidence of bias is difficult to compile; and that evi-
dence of bias in some aspects of the justice system is balanced by evidence
that the system acts to correct or to punish bias in other sectors of the
society.
This essay places the perceptions of one minority group, black Ameri-
cans, in a context that explains the source and the strength of minority
conviction that courts (as well as other non-minority social institutions)
are capable of bias. In terms informed by the insights of cognitive psychol-
f Professor of Law, New York University. Member, New York State Judicial Commission on
Minorities. Research relied upon in this essay was supported by the Filomen d'Agostino and Max E.
Greenberg Research Fund of New York University School of Law and augmented by data assembled
by the Judicial Commission. Opinions expressed in the essay are the author's and may not reflect the
views of other Commissioners.
1. A national survey commissioned in 1977 by the National Center for State Courts reported that
49% of blacks, 34% of Hispanics and 15% of whites agree with the statement "courts do not treat
blacks as well as they treat whites" and thought it described a "serious problem that occurs often."
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE COURTS 36 (1977). A 1988
New York Times/WCBS-TV News poll conducted in New York City found that 45% of whites, but
only 28% of blacks, believed that judges and courts in New York City generally treat both races fairly.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 2. In the same year, a Newsday poll of black New Yorkers
found that 40% believed the courts "mistreat" blacks "all or most of the time." Newsday, Apr. 12,
1988, at 26, col. 1. A national poll, conducted in 1988 by Media General and the Associated Press,
found that 40% of whites and 61% of blacks believe that minorities do not receive equal treatment in
the criminal justice system. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1988, at 13, col. 5. In a New York Law Journal
poll, also conducted in 1988, 44% of all respondents, including 71% of blacks and 31% of whites,
believed that if "two people-one white, one black-are convicted of identical crimes" the white de-
fendant would get the lighter sentence. N.Y.L.J., May 24, 1988, at 1, col. 3. See also B. CURRAN,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977); T. Tyler, Why People Follow the Law: Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy and Compliance (forthcoming 1989).
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ogy and psychoanalysis, Section I explains the heuristics that structure
perceptions of and interactions with black Americans. In terms informed
by psychiatric studies of black Americans, Section II describes the experi-
ence of being perceived in terms of ubiquitous and usually pejorative heu-
ristic structures. Section III draws upon the perspectives described in the
preceding Parts to consider ways in which minorities are perceived within
the legal system and the relationship between those modes of perception
and the minority view that the legal system is an agent of bias.
I. THE LENS THROUGH WHICH BLACKS ARE PERCEIVED
The work of Professor Charles Lawrence2 has sensitized legal scholars
to basic psychological facts about race and perception. In urging that anti-
discrimination laws be liberated from existing standards of intentionality,
Lawrence argues that, as a matter of history, culture, and psychology,
American racism is pervasive and largely unconscious:
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this
shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes,
and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce
negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that
this cultural belief system has influenced all of us, we are all racists.
At the same time, most of us are unaware of our racism.3
The claim of pervasive, unconscious racism is easily devalued. The
charge has come to be seen as egregious defamation and to carry an aura
of irresponsibility." Nonetheless, the claim is well founded. It must be ex-
amined and understood, rather than resisted. It is examined here in the
context of a small incident. The incident, reported below, will be analyzed
first from the point of view of a white participant and as an instance of
stereotyping. In Section II, it will be analyzed from the point of view of a
black participant and as an instance of the "incessant, often gratuitous
and subtle offenses" defined by black mental health professionals as
"microaggressions." '
The scene is a courthouse in Bronx, New York. A white assistant
city attorney "takes the court elevator up to the ninth floor. At the
fifth floor, the doors open. A black woman asks: 'Going down?'
2. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
3. Id. at 322 (citation omitted).
4. See Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1418 (1988) (explaining relationship between "the stigmatization of overt racial
prejudice" and judicial reluctance to impose "the moral opprobrium that the 'racist' label connotes").




'Up,' says [the city attorney]. And then, as the doors close: 'You see?
They can't even tell up from down. I'm sorry, but it's true.'"
The black woman's words are subject to a variety of interpretations.
She may have thought it efficient, appropriate, or congenial to ask the
direction of the elevator rather than to search for the indicator. The indi-
cator may have been broken. Or, the woman may have been incapable of
competent elevator travel. The city attorney is led, by cognitive habit and
by personal and cultural history, to seize upon the pejorative
interpretation.
The city attorney lives in a society in which blacks are commonly re-
garded as incompetent. The traditional stereotype of blacks includes infer-
ior mentality, primitive morality, emotional instability, laziness, boister-
ousness, closeness to anthropoid ancestors, occupational instability,
superstition, care-free attitude, and ignorance.7 Common culture rein-
forces the belief in black incompetence in that the black is "less often
depicted as a thinking being."8 If, for example, the city attorney watches
television, she has observed that whites, but not blacks, are likely to exert
authority or display superior knowledge; that whites, but not blacks, dis-
pense goods and favors; and that blacks are disproportionately likely to be
dependent and subservient.9
Cognitive psychologists tell us that the city attorney shares with all
human beings a need to "categorize in order to make sense of experience.
Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each one on
an individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope."' In a world in
which sidewalk grates routinely collapsed under the weight of an average
person, we would walk around sidewalk grates. We would not stop to
inspect them and distinguish secure ones from loose ones: It is more effi-
6. P. PRESCOTr, THE CHILD SAVERS 169 (1981).
7. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 196-98 (1954). The stereotype also includes over-
assertiveness, religious fanaticism, fondness for gambling, gaudy and flashy dress, violence, a high
birth rate, and susceptibility to bribery. Id.
More recent opinion studies indicate a reduction in self-reported negative associations with blacks.
J. DovIDio & S. GAERTNER, PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 3-6 (1986). The relation-
ship between self-reported beliefs and actual beliefs is, however, problematic in this context. See infra
notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
8. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, in AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
512, 514 (S. Arieti ed. 1974).
For instance, although he is the district attorney in a [television] program, the black solves a
case with his fists; an underling, who is a white police lieutenant, uses his brains to solve the
same problem. That is, while the district attorney is being beat up, the lieutenant is deploying
squad cars, securing laboratory assistance, and reasoning out his next move. Gratuitously...
the show depicts the lieutenant speaking with a force and an arrogance that would not be
tolerated in a real life situation between a district attorney and his subordinate.
Id. See also Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez & Wills, An Experiment in Racism: TV Commercials, in
TELEVISION AND EDUCATION 62 (C. Pierce ed. 1978).
9. Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez & Wills, supra note 8, at 82; see also J. DovIDiO & S.
GAERTNER, supra note 7, at 8-9, 64-65.
10. Lawrence, supra note 2, at 337.
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cient to act on the basis of a stereotyping heuristic. In a world in which
blacks are commonly thought to be incompetent (or dangerous, or musical,
or highly sexed), it is more efficient for the city attorney to rely on the
generalization than to make individuating judgments.
It is likely that the city attorney assimilated negative stereotypes about
blacks before she reached the age of judgment. She will, therefore, have
accepted them as truth rather than opinion." Having assimilated the ste-
reotypes, the city attorney will have developed a pattern of interpreting
and remembering ambiguous events in ways that confirm, rather than un-
settle, her stereotyped beliefs. 12 If she sees or hears of two people on a
subway, one white, one black, and one holding a knife, she is predisposed
to form an impression that the black person held the knife, regardless of
the truth of the matter.'" She will remember examples of black incompe-
tence and may fail to remember examples of black competence. 4
Psychoanalysts tell us that the stereotype serves the city attorney as a
mental repository for traits and impulses that she senses within herself
and dislikes or fears. According to this view, people manage normal devel-
opmental conflicts involving impulse control by projecting forbidden im-
pulses onto an outgroup.15 This defense mechanism allows the city attor-
ney to distance herself psychologically from threatening traits and
thoughts. In this respect, the pejorative outgroup stereotype serves to re-
duce her level of stress and anxiety.
Historians tell us of the rootedness of the city attorney's views. During
the early seventeenth century, the circumstances of blacks living in what
was to become the United States were consistent with principles of open,
although not equal, opportunity. African-Americans lived both as inden-
tured servants and as free people. 6 This early potential for egalitarianism
was destroyed by the creation of a color-caste system. 7 Colonial legisla-
11. Id. at 337-38 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 339.
13. See G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR 99-115 (1947); see also S.
Fiske & S. Neuberg, Alternatives To Stereotyping: Informational and Motivational Conditions for
Individuating Processes 11 (1986) (unpublished manuscript) ("Once perceiver has accessed a social
category, it is difficult for the perceiver to respond accurately to the target's individuating
characteristics.").
14. See S. Fiske & S. Neuberg, supra note 13, at 12-13.
15. See Lawrence, supra note 2, at 333-34. Standard psychiatric nomenclature defines defense
mechanisms as "[platterns of feelings, thoughts, or behaviors that are relatively involuntary and arise
in response to perceptions of psychic danger." AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 393 (3d rev. ed. 1987). Projection is defined as "[a]
mechanism in which the person falsely attributes his or her own unacknowledged feelings, impulses,
or thoughts to others." Id. at 394.
16. See Burns, Black People and the Tyranny of American Law, 407 ANNALS 156, 157-58
(1973) and authorities cited therein.
17. The color-caste system that has characterized American race relations encompasses more than
a set of stereotyped or prejudiced beliefs. It is an "organized system of sentiments and attitudes ...
expressed in the social practices of the [black and white] groups and in the beliefs they hold about
themselves." A. DAVIS, B. GARDNER & M. GARDNER, DEEP SOUTH: A SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL
STUDY OF CASTE AND CLASS 6 (1941). The social cleavage has been "such that all privileges and
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tures enacted slavery laws that transformed black servitude from a tempo-
rary status, under which both blacks and whites labored, to a lifelong
status that was hereditary and racially defined. 8 Slavery required a sys-
tem of beliefs that would rationalize white domination, and laws and cus-
toms that would assure control of the slave population.
The beliefs that served to rationalize white domination are documented
in an 1858 treatise. In many respects, they echo the beliefs identified one
hundred years later as constitutive of the twentieth century black
stereotype:
[Tihe negro, ...whether in a state of bondage or in his native
wilds, exhibits such a weakness of intellect that . . 'when he has
the fortune to live in subjection to a wise director, he is, without
doubt, fixed in such a state of life as is most agreeable to his genius
and capacity.'
...So debased is their [moral] condition generally, that their hu-
manity has been even doubted. . . . [T]he negro race is habitually
indolent and indisposed to exertion ....
In connection with this indolent disposition, may be mentioned the
want of thrift and foresight of the negro race.
The negro is not malicious. His disposition is to forgive injuries,
and to forget the past. His gratitude is sometimes enduring, and his
fidelity often remarkable. His passions and affections are seldom
very strong, and are never very lasting. The dance will allay his most
poignant grief, and a few days blot out the memory of his most bitter
bereavement.
The negro is naturally mendacious, and as a concomitant,
thievish ...
• ..Lust is his strongest passion; and hence, rape is an offence of
too frequent occurrence.' 9
The laws and customs that assured control of the slave population rein-
forced the image of blacks as incompetent and in need of white govern-
ance. The master was afforded ownership, the right to command labor,
and the virtually absolute right of discipline.20 Social controls extending
beyond the master-slave relationship served to exclude the slave-and in
some respects to exclude free blacks-from independent, self-defining ac-
opportunities, as well as duties and obligations, are unequally distributed between the two
groups .... Both Negroes and whites recognize ... that the white group is superordinate in power
and prestige, and they exemplify this awareness in both their behavior and thought .... [Elach of
the groups is endogamous .... [M]uch of the behavior of both Negroes and whites, especially when
in the presence of each other, can be called 'caste behavior.'" Id. at 15.
18. See Bums, supra note 16, at 158.
19. T. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY 34-40 (1858) (footnotes
omitted).
20. Higginbotham, Racism and the Early American Legal Process, 1619-1896, 407 ANNALS 1,
6-7 (1973).
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tivity. The slave could not obtain education, marry, maintain custody of
offspring against the wishes of the master, or engage in commerce.21
Rights of assembly and movement were closely controlled.22 Social rela-
tionships between whites and blacks were regulated on the basis of caste
hierarchy: Breaches of the social order, such as "insolence" of a slave to-
wards a white person, were criminally punishable.2"
This history is part of the cultural heritage of the city attorney. The
system of legal segregation, which maintained caste distinctions after abo-
lition, is part of her life experience. This "new system continued to place
all Negroes in inferior positions and all whites in superior positions."2
The city attorney is among the
two-thirds of the current population [that] lived during a time when
it was legal and customary in some parts of this country to require
that blacks sit in the back of a bus, give up their seats to whites, use
different rest rooms and drinking fountains, and eat at different
restaurants.25
The civil rights movement and post-1954 desegregation efforts are also
part of the city attorney's cultural heritage. As an educated woman in the
1980s, she understands racial prejudice to be socially and morally unac-
ceptable.26 Psychological research that targets her contemporaries reveals
an expressed commitment to egalitarian ideals along with lingering nega-
tive beliefs and aversive feelings about blacks. "Prejudiced thinking and
discrimination still exist, but the contemporary forms are more subtle,
more indirect, and less overtly negative than are more traditional
forms."27
Recent research also suggests that the city attorney can be expected to
conceal her anti-black feelings except in private, homoracial settings.
Many of her white contemporaries will suppress such feelings from their
conscious thoughts. White Americans of the city attorney's generation do
not wish to appear prejudiced. "[Tihe contemporary form[] of prejudice is
21. Id. at 7.
22. Pierce, Stress in the Workplace, in BLAcK FAMILIES IN CRISIS: THE MIDDLE CLASS 27,
28-29 (A. Coner-Edwards & J. Spurlock eds. 1988) (citing G. OLSHAUSEN, AMERICAN SLAVERY
AND AFTER (1983) and G. OLSHAUSEN, CASE BOOK FOR AMERICAN SLAVERY AND AFTER (1983))
("[Slaves] often were unable to assemble (even for purposes of religion or health). Their communica-
tions were controlled. Likewise, they were not permitted to 'stroll or be about,' nor could they be
'insolent' or possess weapons or dogs. Interaction with Whites in dancing, game playing, gambling, or
sexual contact was regulated.").
23. T. COBB, supra note 19, at 273.
24. A. DAVIS, B. GARDNER, & M. GARDNER, supra note 17, at 4.
25. J. DOVIDIO & S. GAERTNER, supra note 7, at 1.
26. After having confessed to being "very racially bigoted," and attributing this attitude to her
experiences in the court system, the city attorney said, "I feel guilty, the way I'm speaking about this
problem. But I can only feel about what I see, and I know what I see." P. PRESCOTT, supra note 6,
at 169.
27. J. DOVIDIO & S. GAERTNER, supra note 7, at 84.
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expressed [at least in testing situations] in ways that protect and perpetu-
ate a nonprejudiced, nondiscriminating self-image."2 Americans of the
city attorney's generation live under the combined influence of egalitarian
ideology and "cultural forces and cognitive processes that . . .promote
prejudice and racism."29 Anti-black attitudes persist in a climate of denial.
The denial and the persistence are related. It is difficult to change an
attitude that is unacknowledged. Thus, "like a virus that mutates into new
forms, old-fashioned prejudice seems to have evolved into a new type that
is, at least temporarily, resistant to traditional . . . remedies." 3
II. THE VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LENS:
MICROAGGRESSION
Return to the fifth floor and to the moment at which the elevator door
opened. The black woman sees two white passengers. She inquires and
perceives the response to her inquiry. She sees and hears, or thinks she
sees and hears, condescension. It is in the tone and body language that
surround the word, "Up." Perhaps the tone is flat, the head turns slowly
in the direction of the second passenger and the eyes roll upward in ap-
parent exasperation. Perhaps the head remains lowered, and the word is
uttered as the eyes are raised to a stare that suggests mock disbelief. The
woman does not hear the words spoken behind the closed elevator doors.
Yet she feels that she has been branded incompetent, even for elevator
travel. This feeling produces anger, frustration, and a need to be
hypervigilant against subsequent, similar brandings.3 '
The elevator encounter is a microaggression. "These are subtle, stun-
ning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' of
blacks by offenders."32 Psychiatrists who have studied black populations
view them as "incessant and cumulative" assaults on black self-esteem. 33
Microaggressions simultaneously sustain[] defensive-deferential
28. Id. The authors show, for example, that anti-black feelings may be masked to the extent that
they are displayed only when there is a nonracial factor that can be used to rationalize them. White
research subjects led to believe that a person was in distress responded in nearly similar ways to black
and to white victims (with a somewhat greater response in the case of black victims) if there was no
apparent justification for a failure to respond. If the subjects knew of the availability of another who
might respond, they "helped black victims much less frequently than they helped white victims (38%
vs. 75%) ...[and] showed lower levels of arousal with black than with white victims (Means =
+2.40 vs. 10.84 [heartlbeats per minute). These subjects thus showed much less evidence of personal
concern, in terms of both physiological response and helping behavior, for black victims than for white
victims." Id. at 77-78.
29. Id. at 85.
30. Id. at 85-86.
31. "[Hleightened vulnerability develops because of the chronic need for hypersurveillance of
one's environment and for preparation for the manifestations of whimsical, arbitrary prejudice. The
person comes to be at greater risk for fractured pride and mistrust." Pierce, Stress in the Workplace,
supra note 22, at 31.
32. Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez & Wills, supra note 8, at 66.
33. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of the Black Minority, supra note 8, at 515.
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thinking and erode[] self confidence in Blacks. . . .[B]y monopoliz-
ing . . . perception and action through regularly irregular disrup-
tions, they contribute[] to relative paralysis of action, planning and
self-esteem. They seem to be the principal foundation for the verifi-
cation of Black inferiority for both whites and Blacks."'
The management of these assaults is a preoccupying activity, simultane-
ously necessary to and disruptive of black adaptation.
[The black person's] self-esteem suffers . . . because he is constantly
receiving an unpleasant image of himself from the behavior of others
to him. This is the subjective impact of social discrimination ....
It seems to be an ever-present and unrelieved irritant. Its influence is
not alone due to the fact that it is painful in its intensity, but also
because the individual, in order to maintain internal balance and to
protect himself from being overwhelmed by it, must initiate restitu-
tive maneuvers. . . -all quite automatic and unconscious. In addi-
tion to maintaining an internal balance, the individual must continue
to maintain a social facade and some kind of adaptation to the of-
fending stimuli so that he can preserve some social effectiveness. All
of this requires a constant preoccupation, notwithstanding . . . that
these adaptational processes . . . take place on a low order of
awareness.
35
Vigilance and psychic energy are required not only to marshall adapta-
tional techniques, but also to distinguish microaggressions from differently
motivated actions and to determine "which of many daily microaggres-
sions one must undercut."3 "
The microaggressive acts that characterize interracial encounters are
carried out in "automatic, preconscious, or unconscious fashion" and
"stem from the mental attitude of presumed superiority."3 They are the
product of the factors described in Part I. The elevator incident represents
their least insidious form. This is so for three reasons. First, the black
woman at the elevator initiated an interaction, thereby providing social
cues that would predictably result in an expressed judgment. The
microaggression she suffered was avoidable. The black woman can in the
future decline to initiate an exchange with a white stranger. To the extent
that she minimizes such exchanges, she can protect against further in-
sult.3 8 Moreover, the microaggression was arguably content-based. The
34. C. Pierce, Unity in Diversity: Thirty-Three Years of Stress 17 (unpublished manuscript
1986).
35. A. KARDINER & L. OvESEY, THE MARK OF OPPRESSION 302-03 (1951).
36. Pierce, Unity in Diversity, supra note 34, at 18; see also Dudley, Blacks in Policy-Making
Positions, in BLACK FAMILIES IN CRISIS, supra note 22, at 22 (describing psychic work associated
with distinguishing racially influenced from other behaviors and fashioning response).
37. Pierce, Psychiatric Problems of Black Minorities, supra note 8, at 515.
38. See E. GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 15 (1967) (describing process of avoidance in social
interaction, illustrated by "the middle- and upper-class Negro who avoids certain face-to-face contacts
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reaction of the city attorney can be interpreted as a response to the wo-
man's question-to the data gathered in the interaction-rather than a
response to the person. Susceptibility to content-based microaggression can
be minimized or controlled, not only by avoiding interactions, but also by
avoiding ambiguity when interactions occur: The black woman might
have said, "The indicator is broken. Is this elevator going up or down?"
The more frequent and more insidious microaggressions, however, are un-
avoidable in that they are neither initiated by blacks nor based in any
apparent way on the behavior of blacks. Finally, the elevator incident is
benign among microaggressions because the white woman's implicit asser-
tion of superiority did not culminate in an achievement of subordination.
A fictitious continuation of the elevator incident illustrates microaggres-
sions that are not only unprovoked in the sense described above but also
complete in their achievement of subordination:
The city attorney decides to leave the elevator. She is standing at the
right side of the car-directly opposite, but several feet away from,
the black woman. Although she might easily exit by walking a path
angled toward the center of the car, she takes a step directly for-
ward. After a moment's hesitation, the black woman steps aside.
This is microaggression in its most potent form. It is the direct descendent
of an aspect of color-caste behavior described fifty years ago as
"deference":
The most striking form of . . . "caste behavior" is deference, the
respectful yielding exhibited by the Negroes in their contacts with
whites. According to the dogma, and to a large extent actually, the
behavior of both Negroes and white people must be such as to indi-
cate that the two are socially distinct and that the Negro is
subordinate. Thus . . . [i]n places of business the Negro should
stand back and wait until the white has been served before receiving
any attention, and in entering or leaving he should not precede a
white but should stand back and hold the door for him. On the
streets and sidewalks the Negro should "give way" to the white
person.39
The wordless interchange was not initiated by the black woman. It was
not based upon any action taken by her. It was a natural manifestation of
an imbedded interactive pattern in which "skin color determines whether
with whites in order to protect the self-evaluation projected by his clothes and manner").
39. A. DAVIs, B. GARDNER & M. GARDNER, supra note 17, at 22-23. Matching restrictions
were imposed upon whites: "A white . . . must not apply to . . . [blacks] any of the symbols of
equality commonly used between whites; and if he disobeys these rules of conduct, he encounters the
disapproval of the white world. If he persists in flaunting custom, he may even become an outcast."
Id. at 24.
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or not one is expected to operate from an inferior or superior vantage
point. Both races have come to expect and accept as unremarkable that the
blacks' time, energy, space, and mobility will be at the service of the
white."4 The inferiority of the black is more than an implicit assertion; it
is a background assumption that supports the seizure of a prerogative.
III. THE LEGAL SYSTEM PERCEIVED BY VICTIMS OF
MICROAGGRESSION
We do not know what business the black elevator traveler has in the
courthouse. Whether she is a judge, a litigant, a court officer, or a va-
grant, it is likely that her view of the legal system is affected by her status
as a regular target of microaggression.41 If she has a role in the system,
she will be concerned about the ways in which she is heard and regarded.
When a court decides matters of fact, she will wonder whether the judg-
ment has been particularized or based upon generalizations from immuta-
ble irrelevancies. When a court decides matters of law, she will wonder
whether it considers and speaks to a community in which she is included.
She will know that not every legal outcome is the product of bias. Some-
times the person on the sidewalk who will not yield turns out to be blind,
or stopping to speak, or also black. Sometimes contrary evidence is so
powerful that stereotypes are overwhelmed; a black person may perform
in such an obviously competent manner that s/he is perceived as compe-
tent. Sometimes contrary evidence is so weak that the influence of stereo-
types is harmless; a black person who asks a seemingly stupid question
may be stupid. At other times, the concerns of the black elevator traveler
seem justified. The two situations described below are the sort that seem
to justify her concerns. The first involves matters of fact and the exper-
iences of three black jurors. The second involves matters of law and the
perspectives from which blacks regard legal pronouncements.
A. Jurors Under the Influence of Microaggression
Robert Nickey has three times assumed the role of juror in the legal
system. On the last occasion, he sat in judgment of a young man of privi-
lege accused of murdering a female companion. Mr. Nickey was one of
three black jurors hearing the case of New York v. Chambers. Mr. Nickey
has worked all of his adult life as a mortician; he considered himself well
qualified to evaluate the evidence in a trial dominated by forensic testi-
mony. 2 When the deliberations began, he felt that his views were un-
40. Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez & Wills, supra note 8, at 65.
41. A minority of blacks, however, will defend against microaggressions by denying the occur-
rence. See Dudley, supra note 36, at 16, 21-22 (identifying and explaining psychic mechanisms asso-
ciated with this kind of denial).
42. New York Judicial Commission on Minorities, Public Hearings of June 29, 1988, at 483
(1988) [hereinafter Hearings] ("In my profession, I've seen all types of murder, suicide, homicide, you
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heeded by white jurors. At hearings convened by New York's Judicial
Commission on Minorities, Mr. Nickey testified that a particular moment
in the deliberations confirmed in his mind a growing sense that racial
difference lay at the heart of juror disagreement:
MR. NICKEY: [The second black juror] asked the remaining ju-
rors, he said, if this man was black, would any of you all have any
difficult[y] convicting him of murder with intent.
MR. CHAIRMAN: He asked that in the jury room?
MR. NICKEY: He asked that in the jury room, and I'm here to
tell you there was a hush[ed] sound in that jury room. Nobody spoke
for five minutes.
And right then we were convinced there was some prejudice be-
cause the young man was white, young, a lot of money was behind
him."3
Mr. Nickey interpreted this moment in the jury room in light of a life
history of microaggression. He had encountered whites who started or
stiffened as he approached on a dark street or subway car but remained
relaxed upon the approach of whites whose appearance and demeanor
were no more threatening. He had encountered whites who did not give
way if he approached on a busy street but yielded to a similarly situated
white. He had often sensed that whites heard his ambiguous or perfectly
sensible words and formed the thought that he "didn't know up from
down."' 4 Robert Chambers did not fit the white jurors' stereotype of an
intentional killer.' 5 From Mr. Nickey's perspective, their inability to con-
ceive of Chambers as an intentional killer combined with an inability to
credit the views of black jurors to produce intransigence and deadlock. He
concluded that "beyond reasonable doubt" meant one thing for white de-
fendants and another for blacks:
[MR. NICKEY:] So I'm saying there is two kinds of justice[] here in
the State of New York. One is for the rich and in my opinion, the
rich, he gets off. He gets like what they call a hand slap. You know,
a little time or no time at all.
But if you are a minority and you don't have any money, you go
to jail, it's as simple as that. You go to jail and you do your time.
And I always felt and was taught that justice was blind to race,
color, or creed. But that is not so here in New York.' 6
name it, I've seen it.").
43. Id. at 483-84.
44. See text accompanying note 6.
45. When the jury was in its ninth day of deliberations, Mr. Chambers pleaded guilty to first
degree manslaughter. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 1. He admitted in his allocution that he
had "intended to cause serious physical injury to [the victim]." Id. at 36, col. 4.
46. Hearings, supra note 42, at 484-85. Mr. Nickey's reference to the combined effects of race
and economic disadvantage is typical and reflective of the continuing reality of economic disadvantage
among black Americans. See CrNTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIEs, FALLING BEHIND
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A second black juror referred to the same moment in the jury room as the
basis of a "strong belief of racial prejudice"" 7 that led him to seek to be
relieved from further service.48 The third black juror, a woman, concluded
that "racial prejudice, sexual harassment, sexism, chauvinistic and elitist
attitudes . . . permeated the jury's deliberation process.""9
These jurors experienced microaggression on two levels. In the context
of the deliberations, a message of inferiority and subordination was deliv-
ered as their views were disregarded. The stereotyped thinking of white
jurors caused both a different evaluation of the evidence and an inability
to credit the competing views and perspectives of the black jurors. As a
result, the black jurors were rendered ineffective in the deliberative pro-
cess. The theory of microagression instructs that the black jurors' percep-
tion of being disregarded and marginalized in the deliberative process pro-
duced stress in direct proportion to the restriction that marginalization
imposed upon their ability to function as factfinders. 50
At a more general level, a social message of inferiority and subordina-
tion was delivered. The black jurors were struck not only by their own
isolation and ineffectiveness in the factfinding process, but also by the ra-
cialist5 character of the process. They took from the deliberations a belief
that legal claims are consigned to a system unable in important respects to
particularize factual judgments, and prone to deliver judgment in accor-
dance with racial stereotypes. The belief that particular jurors were, as a
general matter, inappropriately empathetic or indifferent to the plight of
the defendant may have been disquieting, but the belief that they were
empathetic or indifferent in racially determined ways was an affront. It
said to the black jurors that they, as black people, could not expect impar-
tial consideration were they before the court as defendants or complain-
ants. It increased their subjective need to be hypervigilent against manifes-
tations of arbitrary prejudice and contributed to "the ongoing, cumulative
racial stress[,] . . . anger, energy depletion, and uneasiness that result
from the time spent preoccupied by color-related aspects of one's [life and
work]." 2
The skepticism with which these jurors now regard judicial factfinding
will not be confined to criminal cases involving upper middle class, white
(1984); A. KARDINER & L. OVESEY, supra note 35, at 54-57.
47. Transcript of Proceedings, March 25, 1988, at 52, New York v. Chambers (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Indictment No. 6394/86).
48. Id. at 52, 60-62.
49. Hearings, supra note 42, at 928.
50. See Pierce, Stress in the Workplace, supra note 22, at 31 ("a Black worker is stressed in
direct proportion to the inhibition to control space, time, energy, and movement secondary to overt or
covert racial barriers").
51. Following the example of Professor Stephen Carter, I use the term "racialist" to describe
judgments controlled by racial stereotypes without adopting the accusatory tone suggested by the word
"racist." Carter, When Victims Happen To Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 443 (1988).
52. Pierce, Stress in the Workplace, supra note 22, at 31.
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defendants. Their experience is not extraordinary. It is an example of the
persistent influence exerted by stereotypes-in elevators, on sidewalks, or
in courtrooms. These jurors know from experiences inside and outside the
courthouse that racial stereotypes and assumptions of white superiority
permeate society to create cognitive drifts in the direction of findings of
black culpability and white victimization, black incompetence and white
competence, black immorality and white virtue, black indolence and white
industriousness, black lasciviousness and white chastity, blacks careless
and in need of control and whites in control and controlling, blacks as
social problems and whites as valued citizens. These cognitive drifts
render fragile a wide variety of factual claims: the defense of a black par-
ent charged with child neglect; the claim that the potential and quality of
a black life has been impaired by a white person's negligence; the defense
of a black accused of malpractice; the credibility of a black witness; the
worth of the opinion of a black expert; the merits of a black tenant's re-
quest for a stay of eviction; a black woman's claim of rape. To a people
under the influence of microaggression, the expectation of unbiased judi-
cial factfinding is naive.
B. Law As Microaggression
Mr. Nickey lacks scientific evidence of bias in the court system. He has
as a basis for his assertions only his sense of the cognitive dissonance be-
tween black and white jurors in a particular case, educated by experiences
of American racism and awareness of American history and culture. His
beliefs about decisionmaking in the legal system are, however, consistent
with the results of a research effort that has been described as "far and
away the most complete and thorough analysis of sentencing that [has]
ever been done."' 5' The study addressed the combined effects of the race of
the victim and the race of the defendant upon a sentencer's decision of
whether to impose the penalty of death.
This research, conducted by Professor David Baldus, established that
when a black person has been accused of murdering a white person, the
likelihood that the killer will be sentenced to death is far greater than
when homicide victims and perpetrators fall into any other racial pattern.
The assertions offered in Parts I and II will, if credited, render this fact
unsurprising: "If caste values and attitudes mean anything at all, they
mean that offenses by or against Negroes will be defined not so much in
terms of their intrinsic seriousness as in terms of their importance in the
eyes of the dominant group. ' 54 It is a fact that certainly would not sur-
prise Mr. Nickey.
53. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1399 (citations omitted) (testimony of Professor Richard Berk,
member, Nat'l Academy of Sciences' Comm. on Sentencing Research).
54. Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNAIS 93, 98 (Sept. 1941), quoted in Kennedy, supra
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Two years ago, the Supreme Court considered whether the Baldus re-
search, which contained statistical evidence of an extreme manifestation of
this racial pattern of capital sentencing in the State of Georgia, supported
a claim that Georgia death sentencing procedures violate equal protection
guarantees or prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.55 The
Court found the evidence inadequate to demonstrate "a constitutionally
significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing pro-
cess." 56 With arguments that wither (if they do not die) in the light of
Professor Lawrence's explication of automatic and unconscious racism, 57
the Court found McCleskey's equal protection claim wanting by reason of
his failure to prove the decisionmakers in his case guilty of intentional
discrimination or the State of Georgia guilty of creating its system of capi-
tal punishment with a consciously discriminatory purpose. 8 With respect
to the claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court also found that
too little had been proven to warrant correction of the Georgia death sen-
tencing scheme.59
When the Court announces law, as it did in McCleskey, it "constructs a
response to the question 'What kind of community should we . . .estab-
lish with each other . . .?' 60 The law is perceived as just to the extent
that it hears and respects the claims of each affected class. James Boyd
White explains the point by example:
In evaluating the law that regulates the relations between police offi-
cials and citizens ... the important question to be asked is not
whether it is "pro-police" or "pro-suspect" in result, nor even how it
will work as a system of incentives and deterrents, but what room it
makes for the officer and the citizen each to say what reasonably can
be said, from his or her point of view, about the transaction-the
street frisk, the airport search, the barroom arrest-that they
note 4, at 1395.
55. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
56. Id. at 313.
57. See infra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988); Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1405, 1419-21.
58. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279-82.
59. Id. at 312-13 ("[A]t most, the Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race. Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice sys-
tem. . . . '[T]here can be "no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority
should be used to impose death . . . ." ' Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious.") (citation omitted).
This disinclination to find a relationship between racial disparity and attitudes about race will remain
a feature of the Court's jurisprudence so long as the mechanisms of contemporary racialism remain
unacknowledged. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
109 S. Ct. 706, 723-27 (1989) (discounting evidence of racial disparity among recipients of city con-
tracts and members of contractors' associations as justifications for time-limited minority set aside
program).
60. J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAY ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 34
(1985).
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share. . . .[T]he central concern is with voices: whether the voice of
the judge leaves room for the voices of the parties."1
The relevant voices are not just those of the immediate parties, but those
of all persons whose lives, status, and rights are affected by the announced
law. The rules governing street frisks will be better rules to the extent
that the rulemaker looks beyond the situations of the prosecutor and the
frisked person to consider the positions of, inter alia, the police officer, the
citizen who might be frisked, the citizen who might be victimized, and the
community that shares the ambiguous or neutral characteristics that
aroused suspicion and provoked the frisk.
Having in mind these questions of "voice," consider the reaction of
James Nickey upon announcement of the McCleskey decision. Mr. Nickey
will bring a question to the text: When this matter of constitutional law
was debated, was there room in the argument for my voice? The accumu-
lated effects of microaggressions give cause for skepticism. If there is a
cultural pattern of reacting instinctively to blacks as inferior and subject to
control, it is unlikely that blacks will have figured in legal discourse as
part of the "we" that comes to mind as courts consider how "we" will
govern ourselves and relate to one another. Just as the apparently incom-
petent elevator traveler will not be a credible witness, the being for whom
one does not think of yielding on the sidewalk will not be thought of as an
equal partner when the requirements of justice are calculated.
Mr. Nickey's skepticism will increase when he observes that the Mc-
Cleskey opinion reviews the claim of racially biased capital sentencing
with no reference to the perspective of blacks, either as crime victims or as
victims of discrimination. When the Court goes beyond descriptions of the
trial evidence, other proceedings below, and previously decided cases, the
opinion considers four perspectives: that of criminal defendants, who are
described as a class more likely to benefit from exercises of discretion than
to suffer discrimination;62 that of criminal justice decisionmakers, as to
whom it is said that the burden of explaining acts with racially disparate
outcomes cannot reasonably be imposed;63 that of law enforcement, to
which broad discretion is considered essential;" and that of legislatures, to
whom the Court defers regarding the appropriateness of punishment and
the import of "statistical studies."65
When the Court has canvassed these perspectives, the Georgia death
sentencing disparities are seen as an inevitable byproduct of criminal de-
fendants' opportunity for discretionary leniency; a result of a process with
61. Id. at 47-48.
62. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 311.
63. Id. at 296-97.
64. Id. at 297.
65. Id. at 319.
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so many players and so much complexity that it cannot be explained; an
unavoidable price of effective and efficient law enforcement; and the prod-
uct of innocent and capable legislative judgments.6 The system's discrimi-
natory impact is accepted as constitutionally (and morally 67 ) tolerable.
The discrimination has no apparent victim.
Mr. Nickey will find in the dissenting opinions a reference to the per-
spective of one black person; the petitioner. Justice Brennan gives power
to his claim that the Georgia system is intolerable as a matter of constitu-
tional law as he finds the voice of the system's most direct victim:
At some point in this case, Warren McCleskey doubtless asked his
lawyer whether a jury was likely to sentence him to die. A candid
reply to this question would have been disturbing. . . .[F]rankness
would compel the disclosure that it was more likely than not that the
race of McCleskey's victim would determine whether he received a
death sentence: 6 of every 11 defendants convicted of killing a white
person would not have received the death penalty if their victims had
been black, while, among defendants with aggravating and mitigat-
ing factors comparable to McCleskey, 20 of every 34 would not have
been sentenced to die if their victim had been black. . . .The story
could be told in a variety of ways, but McCleskey could not fail to
grasp its essential narrative line: there was a significant chance that
race would play a prominent role in determining whether he lived or
died.68
Mr. Nickey will appreciate the force of the perspective evoked by Jus-
tice Brennan, but he will sense that it does not prompt consideration of all
that reasonably might be said about the death penalty and racial justice.
In this, as in many constitutional contexts, the most direct of the law's
victims is the least important. The bearer of contraband is subjected to an
unlawful search and appears before the courts to challenge the official
conduct. A judicial rule that respects citizen privacy and autonomy must
look beyond that litigant and imagine the innocent others who might be
searched on the basis of similar conduct or appearance, balancing the in-
terests of those others against the requirements of law enforcement. The
convicted killer is sentenced to die in a process that disproportionately
avenges the killing of whites and punishes the killings of whites by blacks.
He appears before the courts to challenge the official conduct. A judicial
rule that respects the constitutional goal of equal dignity and protection
must look beyond that litigant to balance the requirements of law enforce-
66. Id.
67. A moral judgment is implicit in the Court's Eighth Amendment holding because the Amend-
ment "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
68. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321. For a perceptive description of Justice Brennan's responsiveness
to the voice of McCleskey, see Cole, A Justice's Passion, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 224-28 (1988).
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ment against the interests of two categories of innocent others-those
whom the official conduct fails to protect and those whom it stigmatizes
and subordinates. It is from the perspective of these innocent others that
Mr. Nickey is likely to regard the sentencing of Warren McCleskey and
the Supreme Court's decision to approve the Georgia capital sentencing
system.
Black legal scholars have directly confronted the Court's failure of per-
spective with respect to black people qua actual or potential homicide vic-
tims. Professor Stephen Carter writes:
The significant problem with McCleskey v. Kemp is not, as its critics
contend, that the Court rejected the claim pressed by Warren Mc-
Cleskey himself. The problem is that the majority wrote in a way
that made it possible to evade a more fundamental difficulty raised
by the [statistical evidence]-that racialism might be responsible not
only for the disproportionate execution of murderers who happen to
be black, but for inadequate protection of murder victims who hap-
pen to be black.69
Professor Randall Kennedy's critique of McCleskey portrays the case "in a
community-oriented fashion," and addresses "the plight of black commu-
nities whose welfare is slighted by criminal justice systems that respond
more forcefully to the killing of whites than the killing of blacks .... 2 0
Just as Justice Brennan is right to remind us of the affront-palpable
despite the defendant's status as a convicted killer-to one who may die as
a result of a judgment based upon race, Professors Carter and Kennedy
are right in showing us the blatant inequity of maintaining a system that
responds more vehemently to the unlawful killing of whites than to the
unlawful killing of blacks. But there is more to be said from the perspec-
tive of discrimination's victims. As Mr. Nickey reads McCleskey, he will
sense an inequity that is not captured from the perspective of blacks as
potential crime victims. Professor Carter alludes to that inequity when he
demonstrates that the McCleskey evidence required the Court to condone
or correct "racist policy [that] has been made, and continues to be made,
as the result of probably unconscious . . . categorizations about the rela-
tive values attached to the lives of people of different skin colors."" Pro-
fessor Kennedy alludes to it when he attributes to the Court "a myopia
reminiscent of the one that afflicted . . [it] during the reign of Plessey v.
Ferguson,"2 and accuses its members of "egregious disregard for the sen-
sibilities of black Americans.17
69. Carter, supra note 51, at 443 (emphasis in original).
70. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1394.
71. Carter, supra note 51, at 445.
72. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1415-16.
73. Id. at 1417.
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The McCleskey decision wronged Warren McCleskey to the extent that
it was determined by his race rather than by his culpability. The McCles-
key decision wronged blacks as potential crime victims to the extent that it
reflects a heightened social reaction to unlawful killing when victims hap-
pen to be white. But Mr. Nickey has served as a juror and read the social
message of inferiority and subordination implicit in the racialist character
of the jury process. He knows that when decisionmakers in the court sys-
tem are empathetic or indifferent in racially determined ways, they ex-
press attitudes that leave blacks vulnerable, within and without the court
system, to judgments based upon cognitive drifts that favor their denigra-
tion. He therefore understands that the McCleskey sentence, and its appel-
late affirmations, also wronged blacks as a people."' The wrong can be
stated simply: The McCleskey decisions exemplified and reinforced a pat-
tern of hierarchical judgment predicated upon race. In pronouncing the
Georgia capital sentencing system constitutional, the Court gave legiti-
macy, and a claim of inevitability, not only to the immediate wrong to the
defendant and the secondary wrong to blacks as actual or potential crime
victims, but, far more importantly, to the invidious racial heuristics that
are as embedded in legal decisionmaking as they are in everyday life.
Like the social message of subordination implicit in the deliberations of
the Chambers jury, the McCleskey decisions strike the black reader of law
as microaggressions-stunning, automatic acts of disregard that stem from
unconscious attitudes of white superiority and constitute a verification of
black inferiority. The Court was capable of this microaggression because
cognitive habit, history, and culture left it unable to hear the range of
relevant voices and grapple with what reasonably might be said in the
voice of discrimination's victims.
Sometime before the Supreme Court announced its McCleskey decision,
five black law students reviewed the record and responded in role, imagin-
ing themselves as Justices of the Supreme Court. This Black Supreme
Court was mindful of the seriousness of McCleskey's crime and of the
need of legislatures and law enforcement communities to act efficiently in
the face of unlawful violence. 5 But it also heard the voices of discrimina-
tion's victims. It was equally mindful of the social import of racial pat-
terns in government decisions to take, spare, and avenge life. It found in
the statistical evidence an altogether plausible suggestion of "systemic ra-
cial discrimination" that "can only be discerned by studies of the kind
74. "[D]iscrimination is not ...against individuals. It is discrimination against a people. And
the remedy, therefore, has to correct and cure and compensate for the discrimination against the
people and not just the discrimination against the identifiable persons." Marshall, A Comment on the
Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1006 (1984).
75. Note, MeCleskey v. Kemp, 4 HARV. BLACKLETER J. 75, 75 (Spring 1987) ("[Tlhe criminal
act with which we are confronted is a reprehensible act. The sheer viciousness can neither be mini-
mized nor overlooked."); id. at 77-78 ("[W]e neither abolish the death penalty . . . nor do we unduly
bind the hands of the state of Georgia in administering their [sic] capital punishment statute.").
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[offered by petitioner]." 6 It recalled that the constitutional amendment
under which it was to decide the case was fashioned to effect "the full
emancipation of the former slaves" and therefore should be read to reach
official action that perpetuates racial subordination. It understood that a
tradition of ignoring group effects had rendered American courts impotent
in the face of systemic discrimination.7 9 This court deemed it "imperative,
if we are to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system, to ensure
that race plays no role in the imposition of the penalty of death."80 Ac-
cordingly, it found McCleskey's statistical evidence sufficient to require
the State of Georgia to respond with proof that his death sentence was not
motivated by racial discrimination."'
The result reached by the student court was not an inevitable product
of deliberations that include the voice of discrimination's victims. Deliber-
ations that include that voice are, however, essential to the perceived legit-
imacy of the law. So long as legal decisionmaking excludes black voices,
and hierarchical judgments predicated upon race are allowed insidiously
to infect decisions of fact and formulations of law, minorities will perceive,
with cause, that courts are fully capable-and regularly guilty-of bias.
Minority communities will therefore continue to struggle with a mixed
message of law: announced as the legitimate assertion of collective author-
ity, but perceived as microaggression.
76. Id. at 79.
77. Id.
78. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 171 (1976)
(arguing that Fourteenth Amendment be understood to address "state practices that aggravate the
subordinate position of [African-Americans and other] specially disadvantaged groups").
79. Note, supra note 75, at 79.
80. Id. at 80.
81. Id. at 78.
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